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Frank Maas. The Price of Alliance: The Politics and Procurement of 
Leopard Tanks for Canada’s NATO Brigade. Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 2017. Pp. 170.
“Defence procurement,” political scientist Kim Richard Nossal has 
written with considerable understatement, “is not something that 
Canadians do well.”1 From the historic cases of the Ross rifle and 
the Avro Arrow to the modern Sea King helicopter replacement and 
the Victoria-class submarine purchase to the ongoing F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter controversy, Canadian defence policy is replete with 
mismanaged, drawn-out, costly, and politically volatile weapons 
acquisition processes. One would think there would be a considerable 
literature devoted to procurement because of this but there is not. 
Fortunately, University of British Columbia Press, through its 
excellent Studies in Canadian Military History series, is addressing 
that gap. Frank Maas has made a well-researched and revealing 
contribution to this literature with his work on the political and 
military decision-making behind the procurement of Leopard 1 tanks 
for 4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (hereafter the Brigade), 
Canada’s Cold War contribution to the defence of Western Europe.2
There is a famous story about a 1910 meeting between British 
General Henry Wilson and French General Ferdinand Foch, 
commanders of their respective country’s staff colleges. “What is the 
smallest British military force that would be of practical assistance 
to you?” Wilson is purported to have asked Foch about a future war 
with Germany. Foch quipped “A single British soldier – and we will 
see to it that he is killed.”3 It could be argued that the Brigade played 
1  Kim Richard Nossal, Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada 
(Toronto: Dundurn, 2016), 19-20.  This is a concise and incisive overview of 
everything that is wrong with procurement in Canada.
2  The two other admirable works on procurement from the series are Aaron 
Plamondon, The Politics of Procurement: Military Acquisition in Canada and the 
Sea King Helicopter (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010); and 
Randall Wakelam, Cold War Fighters: Canadian Aircraft Procurement, 1945-1954 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011). For a military focused 
history of the Brigade, see Sean Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO 
Brigade in Europe 1951-1993 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1997).  For 
the less military inclined, an excellent and more readable account that covers the 
years Maas does not is Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade 
in Germany, 1951-64 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013). 
3  Margaret MacMillan, ed., Barbara W. Tuchman: The Guns of August. The Proud 
Tower (New York: Library of America, 2012), 64.
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a similar role in Europe to that single British soldier, and Canadian 
defence policy often appeared to Europe to constitute a search for the 
smallest force that would be of practical assistance. Though no one 
questioned the professionalism of Canada’s military, its size meant that 
its contribution to the collective security of Europe was more symbolic 
than real, and therefore of more political than military value. But 
the continued presence of the Brigade on the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation’s (NATO) central front, where its survival prospects in 
the event of a full-scale Soviet armoured thrust were bleak, nevertheless 
reassured European allies that North America remained committed 
to their defence. Europeans, “[w]anting the ‘cash’ of forward deployed 
troops, cared little for the ‘credit’ of additional troops in Canada” (p. 
5). The Brigade in turn gave Canada some voice in alliance affairs, but 
as Maas notes, if the presence of the Brigade bought Canada a seat at 
the table, tanks were the club dues.
By the late 1960s, the Brigade’s Centurion tanks were maintenance 
nightmares shortly to reach the end of their service lives, and the 
debate over their replacement vexed civil-military decision-makers.4 
Maas describes the debate as a battle waged between “traditionalists” 
and “revisionists.” The traditionalists—the Departments of National 
Defence (DND) and External Affairs, supporters of NATO in Cabinet, 
and Canada’s NATO allies—argued for the retention of the Brigade in 
Europe and equipping it with tanks to make a credible contribution to 
NATO in support of alliance cohesion and solidarity. The revisionists 
tended to be civilians, mainly in Cabinet, who were skeptical of 
the scale of Canada’s NATO commitment given Europe’s postwar 
economic recovery and ability to defend themselves, and critical of 
the scale of the Canadian defence budget, so much of which was being 
spent in Europe. They argued for a reduced and restructured NATO 
contribution, perhaps with a deployment away from NATO’s central 
front, or even withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe entirely. 
In the revisionists’ view, tanks were only required for the defence of 
Europe and not of Canada, and they should be replaced with a Direct 
Fire Support Vehicle (DFSV)—smaller, lighter, and air-transportable 
4  Canada did seriously contemplate simply refurbishing the Centurions to squeeze 
more life out of them.  The Israelis after all had upgraded their Centurions into 
formidable fighting machines. Though this was a potentially cost-effective solution, it 
was rejected primarily over parts availability and interoperability as no other NATO 
ally would remain a Centurion user.
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from Canada (which tanks were not); more useful for lower intensity 
operations within and outside of NATO (such as peacekeeping); and 
decidedly cheaper.
Though debate about what to do about the Brigade and whether 
it would be equipped with heavy or light vehicles began under the 
Liberal government of Prime Minister Lester Pearson in the wake of 
the 1964 Defence White Paper, discussion at the time was dominated 
by the traditionalists and little change was contemplated. It was 
only after Pierre Trudeau, a committed revisionist, came to power in 
1968 that the traditionalists found their influence curtailed. After a 
defence review in 1969, Trudeau announced that the Brigade would 
be reduced in size and the Centurions would be replaced by DFSVs. 
This decision that Canada was getting out of the tank business was 
confirmed in the 1971 Defence White Paper and then confirmed 
by Cabinet again in 1973 in the face of stiff internal resistance, 
mostly from Chief of the Defence Staff Lieutenant-General Jacques 
Dextraze and others in DND. In fact, Maas characterises the extent 
of bureaucratic obstruction of the revisionists’ goals as bordering on 
subversion of civilian control of the military. By 1975, after yet another 
defence review, Trudeau altered course, and in 1976 Canada signed a 
contract to purchase 128 Leopard tanks from West Germany (which, 
according to Maas’ account, proceeded atypically in that it was a 
highly successful procurement process, aided in no small measure by 
German government and corporate efficiency). 
What had happened to prompt Trudeau’s about-face? Maas 
writes in his introduction that his book contributes to four fields: 
“the analysis of Trudeau’s foreign and defence policies; Canada’s 
relationships with its allies; Canadian defence procurement; and the 
history of the army, particularly the Royal Canadian Armoured 
Corps, during the Cold War” (p. 5). However, it is in the first two 
areas where Maas makes his most important contribution as he reveals 
the impact Canada’s NATO allies had on Trudeau. Maas shows that 
Trudeau’s views evolved considerably over his time in office as he 
interacted with American and particularly European policy makers 
who were deeply worried about the precedent a reduction in Canada’s 
commitment might set for other members of NATO. He came to be 
persuaded of the value of the alliance and Canada’s military role in 
it, symbolic though it might mainly be. It was West Germany which 
exerted the most influence due to the close personal relationship 
Trudeau developed with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. As Ivan Head, 
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Trudeau’s principal foreign policy advisor at this time, described it, 
Schmidt’s views had a profound effect on Trudeau:
A German farmer is not able to detect the identity of a NATO aircraft 
flying overhead as their contrails stream behind them. Besides, he 
knows that those aircraft can flee westward as quickly as they can fly 
eastward. He recognizes the maple leaf on tanks and infantry vehicles, 
however, and knows that there is no escape for them in the event of 
war. These units are reassuring and important, whether or not there is 
a persuasive military role for them (p. 91).5
As a result, Trudeau shifted camps from the revisionists to the 
traditionalists and his government subsequently embarked on a 
large-scale recapitalisation of the Canadian Armed Forces. As Maas 
concludes, Trudeau “made mistakes, but after 1975, he was a far 
better prime minister for defence than scholarship or public opinion 
would suggest, and his defence policy has been unfairly criticized” 
(p. 132).
Maas addresses one persistent myth about the Leopards. Canada 
has always been disappointed that support for NATO has not led 
to greater economic linkages between Europe and Canada. After 
all, Article 2 of the NATO Treaty was incorporated because of 
Canada’s insistence that economic ties were as important a part of 
collective security as defence ties. But Trudeau, pursuing a “Third 
Option” to reduce economic dependence on the United States, found 
he could not achieve a so-called “contractual link” with the European 
Economic Community while simultaneously trying to reduce defence 
commitments to Europe. The conventional wisdom regarding the 
Leopard deal has been that Trudeau was forced to retreat from his 
policies in the face of determined opposition from European allies 
who were quite prepared to link their defence needs to Canada’s 
economic ambitions. Schmidt is even rumoured to have bluntly told 
Trudeau, “No tanks, no trade” (p. 105). However, Maas convincingly 
argues that European economic linkages were more implicit than 
explicit, and though they clearly influenced the decision on tanks, it 
was not quite the case of extortion as has been claimed.
5  Head’s relating of a comment Schmidt made to Trudeau, as quoted in Maas from 
Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau, The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s Foreign 
Policy 1968-1984 (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1995), 273-4.
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Canada faced a somewhat similar situation in the 2000s when 
its Leopards were reaching the end of their service lives. However, 
the Army, no longer committed to Europe since withdrawal of the 
Brigade in 1994, now argued that they did not need a tank given 
the changed nature of combat in the twenty-first century. The 
Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien agreed to 
purchase the American Stryker DFSV instead, itself derived from 
the Canadian LAV III family of wheeled light armoured vehicles. 
However, combat experience in Afghanistan, where Leopards were 
deployed in support of Canadian troops (with debateable results), 
convinced the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper—spearheaded by a former tank commander Defence Minister 
supported by armoured elements of the Army—that the tank still 
had a role to play on a counterinsurgency battlefield. The DFSV idea 
was shelved, and after a procurement process conducted at a speed 
unheard of by Canadian standards, a replacement tank was selected 
and delivered. The tank chosen: the German Leopard 2.6
russell isinger, university of saskatchewan
6  The Leopard 2 procurement decision is also worthy of academic attention. For one 
point of view on the acquisition, see Michael Byers and Stuart Webb, Stuck in a 
Rut: Harper Government Overrides Military, Insists on Buying Outdated Equipment 
(Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives/Rideau Institute, 2013), https://
www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20
Office/2013/09/Stuck_in_a_Rut.pdf.
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